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Abstract
Genome sequencing technology has advanced at a rapid pace and it
is now possible to generate highly-detailed genotypes inexpensively. The
collection and analysis of such data has the potential to support various
applications, including personalized medical services. While the benefits
of the genomics revolution are trumpeted by the biomedical community,
the increased availability of such data has major implications for personal
privacy; notably because the genome has certain essential features, which
include (but are not limited to) (i) an association with certain diseases,
(ii) identification capability (e.g., forensics), and (iii) revelation of family
relationships. Moreover, direct-to-consumer DNA testing increases the
likelihood that genome data will be made available in less regulated envi-
ronments, such as the Internet and for-profit companies. The problem of
genome data privacy thus resides at the crossroads of computer science,
medicine, and public policy. While the computer scientists have addressed
data privacy for various data types, there has been less attention dedicated
to genomic data. Thus, the goal of this paper is to provide a systemati-
zation of knowledge for the computer science community. In doing so,
we address some of the (sometimes erroneous) beliefs of this field and we
report on a survey we conducted about genome data privacy with biomed-
ical specialists. Then, after characterizing the genome privacy problem,
we review the state-of-the-art regarding privacy attacks on genomic data
and strategies for mitigating such attacks, as well as contextualizing these
attacks from the perspective of medicine and public policy. This paper
concludes with an enumeration of the challenges for genome data privacy
and presents a framework to systematize the analysis of threats and the
design of countermeasures as the field moves forward.
∗Work done while at the Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne
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I Introduction
The genomic era began with the announcement ten years ago that the Human
Genome Project (HGP) had completed its goals [Guttmacher and Collins, 2003].
The technology associated with genome sequencing has progressed at a rapid
pace, and this has coincided with the rise of cheap computing and communica-
tion technologies. Consequentially, it is now possible to collect, store, process,
and share genomic data in a manner that was unthinkable at the advent of
the HGP. In parallel with this trend there has been significant progress on un-
derstanding and using genomic data that fuels a rising hunger to broaden the
number of individuals who make use of their genomes and to support research
to expand the ways in which genomes can be used. This rise in the availabil-
ity and use of genomic data has lead to many concerns about its security and
privacy. These concerns have been addressed with efforts to provide techni-
cal protections and a corresponding series of demonstrations of vulnerabilities.
Given that much more research is needed and expected in this area, this seems
like a good point to overview and systematize what has been done in the last
decade and provide ideas on a framework to aid future efforts.
To provide context, consider that it was not until the early 1990s when
sequencing the human genome was posited as a scientific endeavor. The first
attempt for whole genome sequencing1 (a laboratory process that maps the full
DNA sequence of an individual’s genome) was initiated at the U.S. National
Institutes of Health (NIH) in 1990 and the first full sequence was released 13
years later at a total cost of $3 billion. Yet, sequencing technology has evolved
and costs have plummeted, such that the price for a whole genome sequence is
currently $6K2 and can be completed in two to three days. The “$1K genome
in 1 day” will soon be a reality.
Decreases in sequencing costs have coincided with an escalation in genomics
as a research discipline with explicit application possibilities. Genomic data
is increasingly incorporated in a variety of domains, including healthcare (e.g.,
personalized medicine), biomedical research (e.g., discovery of novel genome-
phenome associations), direct-to-consumer (DTC) services (e.g., disease risk
tests), and forensics (e.g., criminal investigations). For example, it is now pos-
sible for physicians to prescribe the “right drug at the right time” (for certain
drugs) according to the makeup of their patients’ genome [Bielinski et al., 2014;
Overby et al., 2010; Gottesman et al., 2013a; Pulley et al., 2012].
To some people, genomic data is considered (and treated) no different than
traditional health data (such as what might be recorded in one’s medical record)
or any other type of data more generally [Bains, 2010; Rothstein, 2005]. While
genomic data may not be “exceptional” in its own right, it has many features
that distinguish it (discussed in depth in the following section) and there is a
common belief that it should be handled (e.g., that is stored, processed, and
1In this study, we refer to the process of obtaining the Whole Genome Sequence (WGS) or
the Whole Exome Sequence (WES) as sequencing and the process of obtaining the variants
(usually only single nucleotide polymorphisms, or SNPs) as genotyping.
2http://goo.gl/UdxsP8
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managed) with care. The privacy issues associated with genomic data are com-
plex, particularly because such data has a wide range of uses and provides
information on more than just the individual from which the data was derived.
Yet, perhaps most importantly, there is a great fear of the unknown. Every day,
we learn something new about the genome, whether it be knowledge of a new
association with a particular disease or proof against a previously reported as-
sociation. We have yet to discover everything there is from DNA, which makes
it almost impossible to assign exact value, and thus manage DNA as a personal
asset (or public good). So, as the field of genomics evolves, so too will the views
on the privacy-sensitivity of genomic data. As this paper progresses, we review
some of the common beliefs revolving around genome privacy. And, in doing,
we report on the results of a survey we conducted with biomedical specialists
regarding their perspective on genomic data privacy issues.
It should be recognized that there exist numerous publications on technical,
ethical, and legal aspects of genomics and privacy. The research in the field
covers privacy-preserving handling of genomic data in various environments (as
will be reviewed in this paper). Yet, there are several challenges to ensuring that
genomics and privacy walk hand-in-hand. One of the challenges that computer
scientists face is that these views tend to be focused on one aspect of the problem
in a certain setting with a certain discipline’s perspective. From the perspective
of computer science, there is a need for a complete framework which shows (i)
what type of security and privacy requirements are needed in each step of the
handling of genomic data, (ii) a characterization of the various threat models
that are realized at each step, and (iii) open computational research problems.
By providing such a framework in this paper, we are able to illustrate the
important problems of genomic privacy to computer science researchers working
on security and privacy problems more generally.
Related Surveys and Articles. Privacy issues caused by forensic, medical
and other uses of genomic data have been studied in the past few years [Stajano
et al., 2008; Stajano, 2009; Malin, 2005a; Naveed, 2014; Cristofaro, 2014]. A
recent survey [Erlich and Narayanan, 2013] discusses identity breaches using
genomic data and proposes methods for protection. It addresses topics that
we discuss in Sections VI and Section IX of this paper. In Section IX we
present an end-to-end picture for the handling of genomic data in a variety
of contexts as shown in Figure 9, while [Erlich and Narayanan, 2013] discusses
how access control, data anonymization and cryptographic techniques can be
used to prevent genetic privacy breaches. Moreover, [Erlich and Narayanan,
2013] has been written for a general audience, whereas this paper is meant for
computer scientists (and in particular security and privacy specialists).
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are:
• We provide an extensive literature survey3 of computer science as well as
medical literature about genome privacy.
3In this paper, the word “survey” is used to mean literature survey as well as opinion poll,
however, the meaning will be clear from the context.
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• We report on the results of an expert survey (opinion poll) we conducted
with biomedical specialists’ regarding their point of view on the security and
privacy of genomic data.
• We develop an end-to-end framework for the security and privacy of genomic
data in a variety of healthcare, biomedical research, legal and forensics and
direct-to-consumer contexts.
• We present what we believe to be the first document that reflects the opinions
of computer science, medical, and legal researchers for this important topic.
We also provide an online tutorial4 of biology and other related material
to define technical terms used in this (and other) paper(s) on the security and
privacy of genomic data. The remainder of this SoK is organized as follows.
Section II explains to what extent genomic data is distinct from data in general
and health information in particular. Section III provides an overview of uses
of genomic data for the non-specialist. Section IV emphasizes the relevance of
genome privacy. Section V reports on the findings of a survey we conducted
with 61 biomedical researchers regarding the importance of genomic data pri-
vacy and security. Sections VI and VII provide literature surveys, where the
former summarizes the problem (i.e., the privacy risk) and the latter summa-
rizes possible solutions. Section VIII summarizes the challenges for genomic
medicine and privacy. Based on this analysis, Section IX offers a general frame-
work for privacy-preserving handling of genomic data, including an extensive
threat model that discusses what type of attacks are possible at each step of the
data flow. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section IX.J.3.
II Essential features of genomic data
Consider the following scenario. Alice decides to have her genome sequenced
by a service called MyGenome.com that keeps her data in a repository and
gives Alice information about it over time. At first she uses information from
MyGenome to explore parts of her family tree and contribute her genomic data,
along with some facts about herself, to support medical research on diseases of
her choosing. Many years after MyGenome performed the initial sequencing,
Alice began experiencing health problems for which she visited a doctor who
used her genomic data to help diagnose a likely cause and customize a treat-
ment based on variation in her genome sequence. Alice was impressed by this
experience and wondered what other conditions might be in her future. After
some exploration she discovered that evidence (based on published research pa-
pers) suggested a high risk of dementia for people with her genomic profile. She
worried that various parties, including MyGenome, the genealogy service, and
research studies with whom she shared her data, might share this and other
information in ways that she did not expect or intend and whether this might
have undesired consequences for her.
4Available at https://sites.google.com/site/genomicssok/
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Figure 1: Properties of DNA that, in combination, may distinguish it from other data
types.
Alice’s story highlights several of the essential features of genomic data. We
depict six of them in Figure 1, which we review for orientation of the reader.
How does the result of a DNA-based lab test differ from that of other tests?
One notable feature is how it is static and of long-lived value. Most tests, es-
pecially ones Alice could do for herself, like taking her temperature and blood
pressure, are of relatively short term value, whereas genomic data changes little
over a lifetime and may have value that lasts for decades. Of course, there are
some exceptions to this longevity. For instance, sequencing techniques improve
in accuracy over time, so tests may be repeated to improve reliability. Addi-
tionally, there are some modifications in DNA that accumulate over time (e.g.,
shortening of the ends of DNA strands due to aging [Harley et al., 1990]). Most
particularly, somatic mutations occur resulting in some degree of mosaicism in
every individual: the most striking examples are the deleterious modifications
of the DNA observed in cancer cells in comparison to DNA derived from normal
cells. However, this long-lasting value means that holding and using genomic
data over extended periods of time, as Alice did, is likely.
Alice’s first use of her genomic data is expected to be a key driver for ap-
plication development in the future. While DNA has been used for some time
in parentage tests, it can be generalized from such studies to enable broader
inference of kinship relations. Services such as Ancestry.com and 23andme.com
already offer kinship services based on DNA testing. While a substantial por-
tion of Alice’s DNA is in common with that of her relatives, it is also unique
to her (unless she has an identical twin). This has another set of implications
about potential use of genomic data, like its ability to link to her personally, a
property that makes DNA testing useful in criminal forensics.
Another of the essential values of DNA relates to its ability for diagnosing
problems in health and behavior. Tests are able to demonstrate increased like-
lihood for conditions like macular degeneration in old age and Alzheimer’s (the
most common form of dementia) [Goldman et al., 2011]. Although these are
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often probabilities, they can have diagnostic value as well as privacy ramifica-
tions [Seddon et al., 2011]. For instance, if Alice’s relatives learned about her
increased risk of dementia, might they (consciously or unconsciously) trust her
judgement a little less? Or might they instead help her to get timely treatment?
This power for good and bad has led genomic data to have a certain “mystique”,
which has been promoted by scientists and the media [Tambor et al., 2002].
Although there are many other types of tests (e.g., protein sequence tests) that
carry key common information with DNA tests, there is a special status that
DNA data has come to occupy, a status that some have phrased as “excep-
tional” [Bains, 2010]. These special fears about the sharing of genomic data,
whether founded or not, cannot be ignored when considering privacy implica-
tions. Hence, while DNA data may or may not be exceptional [Evans et al.,
2010; Gostin and Hodge, 1999], it is special in many ways, and hence warrants
particular care.
III Uses of Genomic Data
An individual’s genomic sequence contains over 3 billion base pairs, which are
distributed across twenty-three chromosomes. Despite its size, it is estimated
that the DNA of two individuals differ by no more than 0.5% [Venter et al.,
2001]; but it is these differences that influence an individual’s health status and
other aspects (as discussed in Section II). To provide further context for the im-
portance of genomic data, this section reviews several of the major applications
in practice and under development.
III.A Healthcare
First, it has been recognized that mutation in an individual’s genomic sequence
can influence his well being. In some cases, changes in a particular gene will
have an adverse effect on a person’s health immediately or at some point in
the future (i.e., the one gene, one disease, or OGOD, model) [Botstein and
Risch, 2003]. As of 2014, there were over 1,600 of these traits reported on in
the literature5, ranging from metabolic disorders (e.g., phenylketonuria, which
is caused by a mutation in the PKU gene) to neurodegenerative diseases (e.g.,
Huntington’s chorea, which is caused by a mutation in the HD gene [MacDonald
et al., 1993]) to blood disorders (e.g., Sickle cell anemia, caused by a mutation
in the HBB gene [Saiki et al., 1985]). While some of these diseases are man-
ageable through changes in diet or pharmacological treatments, others are not
and have no known intervention to assist in the improvement of an individual’s
health status. Nonetheless, some individuals choose to learn their genetic sta-
tus, so that they may order their affairs accordingly and contribute to medical
research [Mastromauro et al., 1987] (as elaborated upon below). Moreover, ge-
netic tests can be applied in a prenatal setting to detect a variety of factors
5http://goo.gl/oQtb7u
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that can influence health outcomes (e.g., if a fetus is liable to have a congenital
defect that could limit its lifespan, such as Tay-Sach’s disease) [Lippman, 1991].
Yet, the majority of variations in an individual’s genome do not follow the
OGOD model. Rather, it has been shown that variation is associated with
change in the susceptibility of an individual to a certain disease or behavior [Bot-
stein and Risch, 2003]. Cancer-predisposing variants in genes such as BRCA1/2
or the Lynch Syndrome are well-known examples. Such variation may also mod-
ify an individual’s ability to respond to a pharmaceutical agent. For instance,
some individuals are strong (weak) metabolizers, such that they may require
a lesser (greater) amount of a drug than is standard practice, or may gain the
greatest benefit from a different drug entirely. This variation has been leveraged
to provide dosing for several medications in practice, including blood thinners af-
ter heart surgery (to prevent clotting) and hypertension management (to lessen
the severity of heart disease) [Pulley et al., 2012]. Additionally, changes in an
individual’s genome detected in a tumor cell can inform which medications are
most appropriate to treat cancer [McDermott et al., 2011].
III.B Research
While the genome has been linked with a significant number of disorders and
variable responses to treatments, new associations are being discovered on a
weekly basis. Technology for performing such basic research continues to un-
dergo rapid advances [Brunham and Hayden, 2012]. The dramatic decrease
in the cost of genome sequencing has made it increasingly possible to collect,
store, and computationally analyze genomic sequencing data on a fine-grained
level, as well as over populations on the order of millions of people (e.g., China’s
Kadoorie biobank [Chen et al., 2011] and UK Biobank [Allen et al., 2014] will
each contain genomic data on 500,000 individuals by the end of 2014, while the
U.S. National Cancer Institute is at the beginning of its Million Cancer Genome
Project [Haussler et al., 2012]). Yet, it should be recognized that computational
analysis is separate from, and more costly than, sequencing technology itself
(e.g., the $1K analysis of a genome is far from being developed).
Moreover, technological advances in genome sequencing are coalescing with
a big data revolution in the healthcare domain. Large quantities of data derived
from electronic health records (EHRs), for instance, are being made available
to support research on clinical phenotypes that, until several years ago, were
deemed to be too noisy and complex to model [Gottesman et al., 2013b]. As a
consequence, genome sequences have become critical components of the biomed-
ical research process [Kohane, 2011].
III.C Direct-to-Consumer Services
Historically, genome sequencing was a complex and expensive process that, as
a result, was left to large research laboratories or diagnostic services, but in the
past several years, there has been a rise in DTC genome sequencing from various
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companies [Prainsack and Vayena, 2013]. These services have made it afford-
able for individuals to become directly involved in the collection, processing,
and even analysis of their genomic data. The DTC movement has enabled in-
dividuals to learn about their disease susceptibility risks (as alluded to earlier),
and even perform genetic compatibility tests with potential partners. Moreover,
and perhaps more importantly, DTC has made it possible for individuals to be
provided with digital representations of their genome sequences, such that they
can control how such information is disclosed, to whom, and when.
Of course, not all consumer products are oriented toward health applications.
For example, genomic data is increasingly applied to determine and/or track
kinship. This information has been applied for instance to track an individual’s
ancestral heritage and determine the extent to which individuals with the same
surname are related with respect to their genomic variance [Jobling, 2001].
III.D Legal and Forensic
Given the static nature of genomic sequences, this information has often been
used for investigative purposes. For instance, this information may be applied
in contested parentage suits [Anderlik, 2003]. Moreover, DNA found at a crime
scene (or on a victim) may be used as evidence by law enforcement to track down
suspected criminals [Kaye and Smith, 2003]. It is not unheard of for residents
of a certain geographic region to be compelled to provide tissue samples to
law enforcement to help in such investigations [Greely et al., 2006]. Given
the kinship relationships that such information communicates, DNA from an
unknown suspect has been compared to relatives to determine the corresponding
individual’s likely identity in order to better facilitate a manhunt.
One of the concerns of such uses, however, is that it is unclear how law en-
forcement may retain and/or use this information in the future. The U.S. Supreme
Court recently ruled that it is permissible for law enforcement to collect and re-
tain DNA on suspects, even if the suspects are not subsequently prosecuted [Lip-
tak, 2013]. Once DNA is shed by an individual (such as from saliva left on a
coffee cup in a restaurant) it has been legislated as an “abandoned” resource [Joh,
2006], such that the corresponding individual relinquishes rights of ownership.
While the notion of “abandoned DNA” remains a hotly contested issue, it is
currently the case in the U.S. that DNA collected from discarded materials can
be sequenced and used by anyone without the consent of the individual from
which it was derived.
IV Relevance of Genomic Privacy
As discussed in Section II, genomic data has numerous distinguishing features
and applications. As a consequence, the leakage of this information may have
serious implications if misused, as in genetic discrimination (e.g., for insurance,
employment, or education) or blackmail [Gottlieb, 2001]. A true story exempli-
fying genetic discrimination was shared by Dr. Noralane Lindor at the Mayo
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Clinic’s Individualizing Medicine Conference (2012) [Lindor, 2012]. During her
study of a cancer patient, Dr. Lindor also sequenced the grandchildren of her
patient, two of whom turned out to have the mutation for the same type of
cancer6. One of these grandchildren applied to the U.S. army to become a
helicopter pilot. Even though genetic testing is not a required procedure for
military recruitment, as soon as she revealed that she previously went through
the aforementioned genetic test, she was rejected for the position (in this case
legislation does not apply to military recruitment, as will be discussed below).
Ironically, the familial aspect of genomics complicates the problems revolv-
ing around privacy. A recent example is the debate between the family members
of Henrietta Lacks and the medical researchers [Skloot, 2013]. Ms. Lacks (de-
ceased in 1951) was diagnosed with cervical cancer and some of her cancer cells
were removed for medical research. These cells later paved the way to impor-
tant developments in medical treatment. Recently, researchers sequenced and
published Ms. Lacks’s genome without asking the consent of her living family
members. These relatives learned this information from the author of the best-
selling book “The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks” [Skloot and Turpin, 2010],
and they expressed the concern that the sequence contained information about
her family members. After complaints, the researchers took her genomic data
down from public databases. However, the privacy-sensitive genomic informa-
tion of the members of the Lacks family was already compromised because some
of the data had already been downloaded and many investigators had previously
published parts of the cells’ sequence. Although the NIH entered into an agree-
ment with the Lacks family to give them a voice in the use of these cells [Ritter,
2013], there is no consensus about the scope of control that individuals and their
families ought to have over the downstream of their cells. Thousands of people,
including James Watson [APOC, 2009], have placed their genomic data on the
Web without seeking permission of their relatives.
One of the often voiced concerns regarding genomic data is its potential for
discrimination. While, today, certain genome-disease and genome-trait associ-
ations are known, we do not know what will be inferred from one’s genomic
data in the future. In fact, a grandson of Henrietta Lacks expressed his concern
about the public availability of his grandmother’s genome by saying that “the
main issue was the privacy concern and what information in the future might
be revealed”. Therefore, it is likely that the privacy-sensitivity of genomic data,
and thus the potential threats will increase with time.
Threats emerging from genomic data are only possible via the leakage of
such data, and, in today’s healthcare system, there are several candidates for
the source of this leakage. Genomic data can be leaked through a reckless clini-
cian, the IT of a hospital (e.g., through a breach of the information security), or
the sequencing facility. If the storage of such data is outsourced to a third party,
data can also be leaked from such a database through a hacker’s activity or a
disgruntled employee. Similarly, if the genomic data is stored by the individual
6Having a genetic mutation for cancer only probabilistically increases the predisposition to
cancer.
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himself (e.g., on his smartphone), it can be leaked due to a malware. Further-
more, surprisingly, sometimes the leakage is performed by the genome owner.
For example, on a genome-sharing website, OpenSNP.org, people upload the
variants in their genomes – sometimes with their identifying material, including
their real names.
One way of protecting the privacy of individuals’ genomic data is through
the law or via policy. In 2007, the U.S. adopted the Genetic Information Nondis-
crimination Act (GINA), which prohibits certain types of discrimination in ac-
cess to health insurance and employment. Similarly, the U.S. Presidential report
on genome privacy [Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues,
2012] discusses policies and techniques to protect the privacy of genomic data.
in 2008, the Council of Europe adopted the convention concerning genetic test-
ing for health purposes [Council of Europe, 2008]. There are, in fact, hundreds
of legal systems in the world, ranging in scope from federal to state / province,
and municipality level and each can adopt different definitions, rights, and re-
sponsibilities for an individual’s privacy. Yet, while such legislation may be put
into practice, it is challenging to enforce because the uses of data cannot always
be detected. Additionally, legal regimes may be constructed such that they are
subject to interpretation or leave loopholes in place. For example, GINA does
not apply to life insurance or the military [Altman and Klein, 2002]. Therefore,
legislation alone, while critical in shaping the norms of society, is insufficient to
prevent privacy violations.
The idea of using technical solutions to guarantee the privacy of such sen-
sitive and valuable data brings about interesting debates. On one hand, the
potential importance of genomic data for mankind is tremendous. Yet, privacy-
enhancing technologies may be considered as an obstacle to achieving these
goals. Technological solutions for genome privacy can be achieved by various
techniques, such as cryptography or obfuscation (proposed solutions are dis-
cussed in detail in Section VII). Yet, cryptographic techniques typically reduce
the efficiency of the algorithms, introducing more computational overload, while
preventing the users of such data from “viewing” the data. And, obfuscation-
based methods, reduce the accuracy (or utility) of genomic data. Therefore, es-
pecially when human life is at stake, the applicability of such privacy-enhancing
techniques for genomic data is questionable.
On the other hand, to expedite advances in personalized medicine, genome-
phenome association studies often require the participation of a large number
of research participants. To encourage individuals to enroll in such studies,
it is crucial to adhere to ethical principles, such as autonomy, reciprocity and
trust more generally (e.g., guarantee that genomic data will not be misused).
Considering today’s legal systems, the most reliable way to provide such trust
pledges may be to use privacy-enhancing technologies for the management of
genomic data. It would severely discredit a medical institution’s reputation
if it failed to fulfill the trust requirements for the participants of a medical
study. More importantly, a violation of trust could slow down genomic research
(e.g., by causing individuals to think twice before they participate in a medical
study) possibly more than the overload introduced due to privacy-enhancing
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technologies. Similarly, in law enforcement, genomic data (now being used in
FBI’s Combined DNA Index System – CODIS) should be managed in a privacy-
preserving way to avoid potential future problems (e.g., mistrials, law suits).
In short, we need techniques that will guarantee the security and privacy of
genomic data, without significantly degrading the efficiency of the use of genomic
data in research and healthcare. Obviously, achieving all of the aforementioned
properties would require some compromise. Our expert survey (discussed in
Section V) begins to investigate what tradeoffs users of such data would consider
appropriate.
V Genomics/Genetics Expert Survey
The field of genomics is relatively young and, its privacy implications are still
being refined. Based on informal discussions (primarily with computer scien-
tists), we identified eight common beliefs. To investigate the extent to which
these beliefs are held by the biomedical community, we designed and obtained
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval to conduct a survey of biomedi-
cal professionals regarding security and privacy7. Specifically, the survey was
designed to inquire about (i) widely held beliefs about genome privacy, (ii)
ongoing and existing research directions on genome privacy, and (iii) sharing
of an individual’s genomic data. Several prior surveys focused on genome pri-
vacy have been conducted and have focused on the perspectives of the general
public [Kaufman et al., 2009, 2012; Platt et al., 2013; Cristofaro, 2013] and ge-
neticists [Pulley et al., 2008]. Our survey is novel because it investigates the
opinion of biomedical researchers with respect to the intention of data protec-
tion by technical means. We note that our sample size is sufficient to
provide statistically meaningful results. Yet, the main goal of the
expert survey (opinion poll) is to address many confusions computer
scientists have about genomic privacy.
We conducted our survey both online and by paper. Snowball sampling [Good-
man, 1961] was used to recruit subjects for the online survey. This approach en-
ables us to get more responses but the frame is unknown and thus response rate
cannot be reported. We only asked biomedical experts to fill out the survey and
asked them to forward it only to biomedical experts. A URL for the online survey
was sent to the people familiar with genomics/genetics (i.e., molecular biology
professors, bioinformaticians, physicians, genomics/genetics researchers) known
to us and they were asked to forward it to similar people they know. Email
and Facebook were used to conduct the survey. Eight surveys were collected
by handing out paper copies to participants of a genomics medicine conference.
Overall the survey was administered to 61 individuals. Assuming an arbitrarily
large population of people familiar with genetics, this sample size provides a
confidence interval of 12.5 with a confidence level of 95%, as computed using
the formula described in http://goo.gl/krtGGG. Approximately 53% of the
participants were from the US and 45% from Europe (the rest selected “other”).
7Survey form is available at http://goo.gl/wy7UXH
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The eight beliefs are:
1. Genome privacy is hopeless, because all of us leave biological cells (hair, skin,
droplets of saliva,...) wherever we go.
2. Genomic data is not special and should be treated as any other sensitive health
data e.g. health record or mental health notes.
3. Genome privacy is irrelevant, because genetics is non-deterministic
4. Genome privacy should be left to bioinformaticians, they can provide better
privacy solutions than computer security, privacy and cryptography community
can.
5. Genome privacy will be fully guaranteed by legislation
6. Privacy Enhancing Technologies are a nuisance in the case of genetics: genetic
data should be made available online to everyone to facilitate research, as done
e.g. in the case of the Personal Genome Project
7. Encrypting genomic data is superfluous because it is hard to identify a person
from her variants
8. Advantages of genomic based healthcare justify the harm that genome privacy
breach can cause.
Figure 2: Beleifs about genomic privacy
Figure 3: Expertise of the survey respondents.
The participants were also asked to report their expertise in genomics/genetics
and security/privacy. We show these results in Figure 3.
We now comment on our findings from the survey. The importance of
genome privacy has been advertised in several research papers and articles
(e.g., [Ayday et al., 2013a]). We asked respondents whether they would share
their genomes on the Web (Figure 4). We find that 48% of the respondents are
not in favor of doing so, while 8% would and would go so far as to reveal their
identities. 30% of the respondents think that anonymization (or pseudonymiza-
tion) is sufficient to hide their identity. Recently, Humbert et. al. [Humbert
et al., 2013] showed that the privacy loss of an individual due to publicly avail-
able genomes of his family members is not negligible (discussed in detail in
Section VI). Nevertheless, we observe that 39% support the right to publish
one’s genome (Figure 5).
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Figure 4: Response to the question: Would you publicly share your genome on the
Web?
Figure 5: Response to the question: Assuming that one’s genomic data leaks lot of
private information about his or her relatives, do you think one should have the right
to share his or her genomic data?
As discussed in Section IV, there is a tension between the desire for genome
privacy and biomedical research. Thus, we asked the survey respondents what
they would trade for privacy. As expected, the results (shown in Figure 6)
indicate that the respondents are willing to trade money and test time (duration)
to protect privacy, but they usually do not accept trading accuracy or utility.
Figure 6: Response to the question: What can we compromise to improve privacy of
genomic data? (Multiple options can be checked)
We also asked the respondents to evaluate the importance of existing and
ongoing research directions on genomic privacy (as discussed in detail in Sec-
tion VII), considering the types of problems they are trying to solve (Figure 7).
The respondents all agree that privacy is important in all domains (i.e., health-
care, research, recreational genomics, legal and forensics) and think that privacy
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Figure 7: Relevance of genome privacy research done by computer science community.
is the most important when genomic data is delegated to a third party (e.g.,
storage in a commercial cloud or outsourcing computation of genomic data to a
cloud). The respondents think that privacy is the least important when genomic
data is used for research or healthcare issues.
Finally, we asked whether the respondents agree with the beliefs we intro-
duced earlier in this section. We comment on a few important results (Figure 8).
First, we observe that 20% of the respondents believe that genome privacy is a
Figure 8: Response to the question: Do you believe that: (Multiple options can be
checked). “None” means the respondent does not agree with any of the beliefs.
lost cause (Belief 1), while almost half of the respondents consider genomic data
to be no different than electronic health data (Belief 2). Even though genomic
information is, in most instances, non-deterministic, all respondents agree that
this fact does not reduce the importance of genome privacy (in contrast with
Belief 3). Only 7% of our respondents think that genome privacy should be left
to bioinformaticians (Belief 4). Furthermore, we observe that only 20% of the
respondents believe that genome privacy can be fully guaranteed by legislation
(Belief 5). Notably, only 7% of the respondents think that privacy enhancing
technologies are a nuisance in the case of genetics (Belief 6). According to 11%
of the respondents, the confidentiality of genomic data is superfluous because
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it is hard to identify a person from her variants (Belief 7). And, finally, only
28% of the respondents think that advantages that will be brought by genomics
in healthcare will justify the harm that might be caused by privacy issues (Be-
lief 8). Overall we conclude that the eight beliefs we informally collected do not
reflect the opinion of the biomedical community.
VI Known Privacy Risks
In this section, we survey a wide spectrum of privacy threats to human genomic
data, as reported by prior research.
VI.A Re-identification Threats
Re-identification is probably the most extensively studied privacy risk in dissem-
ination and analysis of human genomic data. In such an attack, an unauthorized
party looks at the published human genomes that are already under certain pro-
tection to hide the identity information of their donors (e.g., patients), and tries
to recover the identities of the individuals involved. Such an attack, once it
succeeds, can cause serious damage to those donors, e.g., discrimination and
financial loss. In this section, we review the weaknesses within existing privacy
protection techniques that make this type of attack possible.
Pseudo-anonymized Data. A widely used method for protecting health in-
formation is the removal of explicit and quasi-identifying attributes (e.g., name
and date of birth). Such redaction meets legal requirements to protect privacy
(e.g., de-identification under the U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act) for traditional health records. However, genomic data cannot be
anonymized by just removing the identifying information. There is always a risk
for the adversary to infer the phenotype of a DNA-material donor (that is, the
person’s observable characteristics like eye/hair/skin colors), which will lead to
her identification, from her genotypes (her genetic makeup). Even though the
techniques for this purpose are still not there yet, the rapid progress in genomic
research and technologies is quickly moving us toward that end. Moreover, re-
identification can be achieved through inspecting the background information
that comes with publicized DNA sequences [Gitschier, 2009; Gymrek et al., 2013;
Hayden, 2013]. As an example, genomic variants on the Y chromosome have
been correlated with surnames (for males), which can be found out using pub-
lic geneology databases. Other instances include identifying Personal Genome
Project (PGP) participants through public demographic data [Sweeney et al.,
2013], recovering the identities of family members from the data released by
the 1000 Genome Project using public information (e.g. death notices)[Malin,
2006], and other correlation attacks [Malin and Sweeney, 2004]. It has been
shown that even cryptographically secure protocols leaks a lot of information
when used for genomic data [Goodrich, 2009].
Aggregate Genomic Data. In addition to the aforementioned re-identification
15
threat, which comes from the possible correlation between an individual’s ge-
nomic data and other public information, the identity of a participant of a
genomic study can also be revealed by a “second sample”, that is, part of the
DNA information from the individual. This happens, for example, when one
obtains a small amount of genomic data from another individual, such as a small
set of her single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), and attempts to determine
her presence in a clinic study on HIV, based on anonymized patient DNA data
published online. This turns out to be rather straightforward, given the unique-
ness of individual’s genome. Particularly, in 2004, research shows that as few
as 100 SNPs are enough to uniquely distinguish one individual from others [Lin
et al., 2004]. Based on this observation, the genomic researchers generally agree
that such DNA raw data are too sensitive to release through online repositories
(such as the NIH’s PopSet resources), without proper agreements in place. An
alternative is to publish “pooled” data, in which summary statistics are disclosed
for the case and control groups of individuals in a study.
Yet, in 2008, Homer and colleagues [Homer et al., 2008] showed that when
an adversary had access to a known participant’s genome sequence, they could
determine if the participant was in a certain group. Specifically, the researchers
compared one individual’s DNA sample to the rates at which her variants show
up in various study populations (and a reference population that does not in-
clude the individual) and applied a statistical hypothesis test to determine the
likelihood of which group she is in (i.e., case or reference). The findings of the
work compelled the NIH, as well as the Wellcome Trust in the UK, to remove
all publicly available aggregate genomic data from their websites. Ever since, re-
searchers are required to sign a data use agreement (prohibiting re-identification)
to access such data [Zerhouni and Nabel, 2008], the process of which could take
several months. At the same time, such attacks were enhanced. First, Homer’s
test statistic was improved through exploitation of genotype frequencies [Jacobs
et al., 2009], while an alternative, based on linear regression was developed to
facilitate more robust inference attacks [Masca et al., 2011]. Wang et. al. [Wang
et al., 2009a] demonstrated, perhaps, an even more powerful attack by showing
that an individual can be identified even from the aggregate statistical data (co-
efficient of determination –r2– values) published in research papers. While the
methodology introduced in [Homer et al., 2008] requires on the order of 10,000
pieces of genome (of the target individual), this new attack required only on
the order of 200. Their approach even shows the possibility of recovering part
of the DNA raw sequences for the participants of biomedical studies, using the
statistics including p-values and the r2.
Quantification of information content in aggregate statistics obtained as an
output of genome-wide association studies (GWAS) shows that an individual’s
participation in the study and her phenotype can be inferred with high ac-
curacy [Im et al., 2012; Craig et al., 2011]. Beyond these works, it has been
shown that a Bayesian network could be leveraged to incorporate additional
background information, and thus improve predictive power [Clayton, 2010]. It
was recently shown that RNA expression data can be linked to the identity of
an individual through the inference of SNPs [Schadt et al., 2012].
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Yet, there is debate over the practicality of such attacks. Some researchers
believe that individual identification from pooled data is hard in practice [Braun
et al., 2009; Sankararaman et al., 2009; Visscher and Hill, 2009; Gilbert, 2008].
In particular, it has been shown that the assumptions required to accurately
identify individuals from aggregate genomic data rarely hold in practice [Braun
et al., 2009]. Such inference attacks depend upon the ancestry of the partici-
pants, the absolute and relative number of people in case and control groups,
and the number of SNPs [Masca et al., 2011] and the availability of the second
sample. Thus, the false positive rates are much higher in practice. Still, others
believe that publication of complete genome wide aggregate results are danger-
ous for privacy of the participants [Lumley and Rice, 2010; Church et al., 2009].
Furthermore, the NIH continues to adhere to its policy of data use agreements.
Beyond the sharing of aggregate data processing, it should be recognized that
millions of people are sequence or genotyped for state of the art GWAS studies.
This sequenced data is shared among different institutions with inconsistent
security and privacy procedures [Brenner, 2013]. On the one hand, this could
lead to serious backlash and fear to participate in such studies. On the other
hand, not sharing this data could severely impede biomedical research. Thus,
measures should be taken to mitigate the negative outcomes of genomic data
sharing [Brenner, 2013].
VI.B Phenotype Inference
Another critical privacy threat to human genome data is inference of sensitive
phenotype information from the DNA sequence. Here we summarize related
prior studies.
Correlation of Genomic Data. Partially available genomic data can be used
to infer the unpublished genomic data due to linkage disequilibrium (LD), a cor-
relation between regions of the genome [Halperin and Stephan, 2009; Marchini
and Howie, 2010]. For example, Jim Watson (the discoverer of DNA) donated
his genome for research but concealed his ApoE gene, because it reveals suscep-
tibility to Alzheimer’s disease. Yet, it was shown that the ApoE gene variant
can be inferred from the published genome [Nyholt et al., 2008]. Such comple-
tion attacks are quite relevant in DTC environments, where customers have the
option to hide some of the variants related to a particular disease.
Kin Privacy Breach. A significant part of the population does not want
to publicly release their genomic data [McGuire et al., 2011]. Disclosures of
their relatives can thus threaten the privacy of such people, who never release
their genomic data. The haplotypes of the individuals not sequenced or geno-
typed can be obtained using LD-based completion attacks [Kong et al., 2008].
For instance, if both parents are genotyped, then most of the variants for their
offsprings can be inferred. The genomic data of family members can also be in-
ferred using data that has been publicly shared by blood relatives and domain-
specific knowledge about genomics [Humbert et al., 2013]. Such reconstruction
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attacks can be carried out using (i) (partial) genomic data of a subset of fam-
ily members, and (ii) publicly-known genomic background information (linkage
disequilibrium and minor allele frequencies (MAFs) This attack affects individ-
uals whose relatives publicly share genomic data (obtained using DTC services)
on the Internet (e.g. on OpenSNP.org). The family members of the individuals
who publish their genomic data on OpenSNP.org can be found on social media
sites, such as Facebook [Humbert et al., 2013].
VI.C Other Threats
In addition to the above threats, there are a few other genome-related privacy
issues, as follows:
Anonymous Paternity Breach. As mentioned above, the Y chromosome
is inherited from father to son virtually intact and genealogy databases link
this chromosome to the surname to model ancestry. Beyond the case discussed
above, this information has been used to identify sperm donors in several cases.
For example, a 15 year boy who was conceived using donor sperm, successfully
found his biological father by sending his cheek swab to a genealogy service
and doing Internet search [Motluk, 2005; Stein, 2005]. Similarly, an adopted
child was able to find his real father with the help of a genealogy database
(and substantial manual effort) [Naik, 2009]. In short, DNA testing have made
tracing anonymous sperm donors easy and theoretically sperm donors can no
more be anonymous [Lehmann-Haupt, 2010].
Legal and Forensic. DNA is collected for legal and forensic purposes from
criminals8 and victims9. On the one hand, forensic techniques are becoming
more promising with the evolving technology [Kayser and de Knijff, 2011; Pak-
stis et al., 2010]. On the other hand, abuse of DNA (e.g., to stage crime scenes)
have already baﬄed people and law enforcement agencies [Bobellan, 2010]. Some
people like Madonna (the singer) are paranoid enough about the misuse of their
DNA that they hire DNA sterilization teams to clean up their leftover DNA
(e.g., stray hairs or saliva) [Villalva, 2012]. We are not aware of any privacy risk
assessment studies done primarily in legal and forensic context, in part because
law enforcement agencies store a very limited amount of genetic markers. Yet, in
the future, it could well happen that law enforcement agencies will have access
to the database of whole genome sequences. We discuss sperm donor paternity
breach in the next subsection and it is also relevant in legal context.
VII State-of-the-art Solutions
In this section, we provide an overview of technical approaches to address various
privacy and security issues related to genomic data. Despite the risks associated
8Using DNA to solve crimes, http://goo.gl/zII3Yo
9What is a Rape Kit, http://www.rainn.org/get-information/sexual-assault-recovery/
rape-kit
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with genomic data, we can find ways to mitigate them to move forward [Altman
et al., 2013]. Some solutions are efficient enough for practical use, while others
will need further development to become practical. In particular, practical
solutions often exploit the special nature of the genomic data to find ways to be
efficient under relevant domain assumptions.
VII.A Healthcare
Personalized medicine. Personalized medicine promises to revolutionize
healthcare through treatments tailored to an individual’s genomic makeup and
genome-based disease risk tests that can enable early diagnosis of serious dis-
eases. Various players have different concerns here. Patients, for instance, are
concerned about the privacy of their genomes. By contrast, healthcare orga-
nizations are concerned about their reputation and the trust of their clients.
And for-profit companies, such as pharmaceutical manufacturers, are concerned
about the secrecy of their disease markers (proprietary information of business
importance).
A disease risk test can be expressed as a regular expression query tak-
ing into account sequencing errors and other properties of sequenced genomic
data. Oblivious automata enable regular expression queries to be computed over
genome sequence data while preserving the privacy of both the queries and the
genomic data [Troncoso-Pastoriza et al., 2007; Frikken, 2009]. Cryptographic
schemes have been developed to delegate the intensive computation in such a
scheme to a public cloud in a privacy-preserving fashion [Blanton et al., 2012].
Alternatively, it has been shown that a cryptographic primitive called Au-
thorized Private Set Intersection (A-PSI) can be used in this setting [Baldi et al.,
2011; Cristofaro et al., 2012]. In personalized medicine protocols based on A-
PSI, the healthcare organization provides cryptographically-authorized disease
markers, while the patient supplies her genome. In this setting, a regulatory
authority, such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), can also cer-
tify the disease markers before they can be used in a clinical setting. Despite
its potential, this protocol has certain limitations. First, it is not very efficient
in terms of its communication and computation costs. Second, the model as-
sumes that patients store their own genomes, which is not necessarily the case
in practice.
To address the latter issue, it has been suggested that the storage of the
homomorphically encrypted variants (e.g., SNPs) can be delegated to a semi-
honest third party [Ayday et al., 2013c]. A healthcare organization can then
request the third party to compute a disease susceptibility test (weighted aver-
age of the risk associated with each variant) on the encrypted variants using an
interactive protocol involving (i) the patient, (ii) the healthcare organization
and (iii) the third party. Homomorphic encryption based methods can also be
used to conduct privacy-preserving computation of disease risk based on both
genomic and non-genomic data (e.g., environmental and/or clinical data) [Ayday
et al., 2013d]. One of the problems with such protocols, however, is that storage
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of homomorphically encrypted variants require orders of magnitude more mem-
ory than plaintext variants. However, a trade-off between the storage cost and
level of privacy can be composed [Ayday et al., 2013b]. A second problem is that
when an adversary has knowledge of the LD between the genome regions and
the nature of the test, the privacy of the patients will decrease when tests are
conducted on their homomorphically encrypted variants. This loss of privacy
can be quantified using an entropy-based metric [Ayday et al., 2013e].
Raw aligned genomic data. Raw aligned genomic data, that is, the aligned
outputs of a DNA sequencer, are often used by geneticists in the research pro-
cess. Due to the limitations of current sequencing technology, it is often the case
that only a small number of nucleotides are read (from the sequencer) at a time.
A very large number of these “short reads”10, covering the entire genome are
obtained, and are subsequently aligned, using a reference genome. The position
of the read relative to the reference genome is determined by finding the ap-
proximate match on the reference genome. With today’s sequencing techniques,
the size of such data can be up to 300GB per individual (in the clear), which
makes public key cryptography impractical for the management of such data.
Symmetric stream cipher and order-preserving encryption [Agrawal et al., 2004]
provide more efficient solutions for storing, retrieving, and processing this large
amount of data in a privacy-preserving way [Ayday et al., 2014].
Genetic compatibility testing. Genetic compatibility testing is of interest
in both healthcare and DTC settings. It enables a pair of individuals to evaluate
the risk of conceiving an unhealthy baby. In this setting, PSI can be used to
compute genetic compatibility, where one party submits the fingerprint for his
or her genome-based diseases, while the other party submits her or his entire
genome. In doing so, the couple learns their genetic compatibility without re-
vealing their entire genomes [Baldi et al., 2011]. Unfortunately this protocol can
leak information about an individual’s disease risk status to the other party and
its requirements for computation and communication may make it impractical.
Pseudo-anyonymization. Pseudo-anonymization is often performed by the
healthcare organization that collects the specimen (possibly by pathologists) to
remove patient identifiers before sending the specimen to a sequencing labora-
tory. In lieu of such information, a pseudonym can be derived from the genome
itself and public randomness, independently at the healthcare organization and
sequence laboratory for symmetric encryption [Cassa et al., 2013]. This process
can mitigate sample mismatch at the sequencing lab. However, since the key is
derived from the data that is encrypted using the same key, symmetric encryp-
tion should guarantee circular security (security notion required when cipher is
used to encrypt its own key), an issue which is not addressed in the published
protocol.
10A short read corresponds to a sequence of nucleotides on DNA. The raw genomic data of
an individual consists of hundreds of millions of short reads, each including around 100
nucleotides.
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VII.B Research
Genome-wide Association Studies (GWAS). Genome-Wide Association
Studies, 11 are conducted by analyzing the statistical correlation between the
variants of a certain genomic region in a case group (i.e., phenotype positive)
and control group (i.e., phenotype negative). GWAS is one of the most common
types of studies performed to learn genome-phenome associations. In GWAS
the aggregate statistics (e.g., p-values) are published in scientific articles and
are made available to other researchers. As mentioned earlier, such statistics
can pose privacy threats as explained in Section VI.
Recently, it has been suggested that such information can be protected
through the application of noise to the data. In particular, differential privacy,
a well-known technique for answering statistical queries in a privacy preserv-
ing manner [Dwork, 2006], was recently adapted to compose privacy preserv-
ing query mechanisms for GWAS settings [Fienberg et al., 2011; Johnson and
Shmatikov, 2013]. In [Fienberg et al., 2011] the authors propose methods for
releasing differentially private minor allele frequencies (MAFs), chi-square statis-
tics, p-values, the top-k most relevant SNPs to a specific phenotype, and specific
correlations between particular pairs of SNPs. These methods are notable be-
cause traditional differential privacy techniques are unsuitable for GWAS due to
the fact that the number of correlations studied in GWAS are much larger than
the number of people in the study. However, differential privacy is typically
based on a mechanism that invokes Laplacian noise, and thus requires a very
large number of research participants to guarantee acceptable levels of privacy
and utility. In [Johnson and Shmatikov, 2013] , Johnson et. al. [Johnson and
Shmatikov, 2013] explain that computing the number of relevant SNPs and the
pairs of correlated SNPs are the goal of a typical GWAS and are not known
in advance. They provide an elegant distance-score mechanism to add noise to
the output. All relevant queries required by a typical GWAS are supported in-
cluding the number of SNPs associated with a disease and locations of the most
significant SNPs. Empirical analysis suggests that the new distance score-based
differentially private queries produce acceptable privacy and utility for a typical
GWAS.
A meta-analysis of summary statistics from multiple independent cohorts
is required to find associations in a GWAS. Different teams of researchers of-
ten conduct studies on different cohorts and are limited in their ability to share
individual-level data due to Institutional Review Board (IRB) restrictions. How-
ever, it is possible for the same participant to be in multiple studies, which can
affect the results of a meta-analysis. It has been suggested that one-way crypto-
graphic hashing can be used to identify overlapping participants without sharing
individual-level data [Turchin and Hirschhorn, 2012].
Sequence comparison. Sequence comparison is widely used in bioinformatics
(e.g., in gene finding, motif finding, and sequence alignment). Such compari-
son is computationally complex. It has been shown that fully homomorphic
11http://www.genome.gov/20019523
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encryption (FHE), secure multiparty computation (SMC) and other traditional
cryptographic tools [Atallah et al., 2003; Jha et al., 2008] can be applied for
comparison purposes, but they do not scale to a full human genome. Alter-
natively, more scalable provably secure protocols exploiting public clouds have
been proposed [Blanton et al., 2012; Atallah and Li, 2005]. Computation on
the public data can be outsourced to a third party environment (e.g., cloud
provider) while computation on sensitive private sections can be performed lo-
cally; thus, outsourcing most of the computationally intensive work to the third
party. This computation partitioning can be achieved using program specializa-
tion which enables concrete execution on public data and symbolic execution
on the sensitive data [Wang et al., 2009b]. This protocol takes advantage of the
fact that genomic computations can be partitioned into computation on public
data and private data, exploiting the fact that 99.5% of the genomes of any two
individuals are similar.
Moreover, genome sequences can be transformed into sets of offsets of dif-
ferent nucleotides in the sequence to efficiently compute similarity scores (e.g.,
Smith-Waterman computations) on outsourced distributed platforms (e.g., vol-
unteer systems). Similar sequences have similar offsets, which provides sufficient
accuracy, and many-to-one transformations provide privacy [Szajda et al., 2006].
Although this approach does not provide provable security, it does not leak sig-
nificant useful information about the original sequences.
Until this point, all sequence comparison methods we have discussed work on
complete genomic sequences. Compressed DNA data (i.e., the variants) can be
compared using novel data structure called Privacy-Enhanced Invertible Bloom
Filter [Eppstein et al., 2011]. This method provides communication-efficient
comparison schemes.
Person-level genome sequence records. Person-level genome sequence
records contrast with the previous methods, which obscure sequences and report
on aggregated data rather than that of a single person. Several techniques have
been proposed for enabling privacy for personal-level genome sequences. For
instance, SNPs from several genomic regions can be generalized into more gen-
eral concepts – e.g.; transition (change of A↔G or T↔C.), transversion (change
of A↔C, A↔T, C↔G or G↔T.), and exact SNP positions into approximate
positions) [Lin et al., 2002]. This generalization makes re-identification of an
individual sequence difficult according to a prescribed level of protection. In
particular, k-anonymity can be used to generalize the genomic sequences such
that a sequence is indistinguishable from at least other k − 1 sequences. Also,
the problem of SNP anonymization can be expanded to more complex variations
of a genome using multiple sequence alignment and clustering methods [Malin,
2005b; Li et al., 2012]. However, such methods are limited in that they only
work when there are a large number of sequences with relatively small number
of variations.
Given the limitations of generalization-based strategies, it has been sug-
gested that cryptographic techniques might be more appropriate for maintain-
ing data utility. In particular, it has been shown that additive homomorphic
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encryption can be used to share encrypted data while still retaining the ability
to compute a limited set of queries (e.g., secure frequency count queries which
are useful to many analytic methods for genomic data) [Kantarcioglu et al.,
2008]. Yet, this method leaks information in that it reveals the positions of
the SNPs, which in turn reveals the type of test being conducted on the data.
Moreover, privacy in this protocol comes at a high cost of computation.
Cryptographic hardware at the remote site can be used as a trusted compu-
tation base (TCB) to design a framework in which all person-level biomedical
data is stored at a central remote server in encrypted form [Canim et al., 2012].
The server can compute over the genomic data from a large number of peo-
ple in a privacy-preserving fashion. This enables researchers to compute on
shared data without sharing person-level genomic data. This approach is effi-
cient for typical biomedical computations. This approach is limited though in
that trusted hardware tends to have relatively small memory capacities, which
dictate the need for load balancing mechanisms.
Sequence alignment. Sequence alignment is fundamental to genome sequenc-
ing. The increase in the quantity of sequencing data is growing at a faster rate
than the decreasing cost of computational power, thus the delegation of read
mapping to the cloud can be very beneficial. However, such delegation can
have major privacy implications. Chen et. al. [Chen et al., 2012] have shown
that read mapping can be delegated to the public cloud in a privacy preserv-
ing manner using a hybrid cloud-based approach. They exploit the fact that
a sequence of small number of nucleotides (≈20) is unique and two sequences
of equal length with edit distance of x, when divided into x + 1 segments will
have at least one matching segment. Based on this fact, computation is divided
into two parts: (i) the public part is delegated to the public cloud, in which the
public cloud finds exact matches on encrypted data and returns small number
of matches to the private cloud, whereas (ii) the private part takes place in a
private cloud, which computes the edit distance using only the matches returned
by the public cloud. This approach reduces the local computation by a factor
of 30 by delegating 98% of the work to the public cloud.
VII.C Legal and Forensic
Paternity testing. Paternity testing determines whether a certain male in-
dividual is the father of another individual. It is based on the high similarity
between the genomes of a father and child (99.9%) in comparison to two unre-
lated human beings (99.5%). It is not known exactly which 0.5% of the human
genome is different between two humans, but a properly chosen 1% sample of
the genome can determine paternity with high accuracy [Gibbs and Singleton,
2006]. Participants may want to compute the test without sharing any infor-
mation about their genomes.
Once genomes of both individuals are sequenced, a privacy-preserving pa-
ternity test can be carried out using PSI-Cardinality (PSI-CA), where inputs
to PSI-CA protocol are the sets of nucleotides comprising the genome. The size
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of the human genome, or even 1% of it, cannot be handled by current PSI and
other SMC protocols. However, by exploiting domain knowledge, the compu-
tation time can be reduced to 6.8ms and network bandwidth usage to 6.5KB
by emulating the Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) chemical
test in software, which reduces the problem to finding the intersection between
two sets of size 25 [Baldi et al., 2011]. Subsequent work demonstrates a frame-
work for conducing such tests on a Android smartphone [Cristofaro et al., 2012].
Since the ideal output of privacy-preserving paternity test should be yes or no,
it cannot be obtained using custom PSI protocols, whereas generic garbled cir-
cuit based protocols can be easily modified to add this capability [Huang et al.,
2011, 2012].
Criminal forensics. rules enable law enforcement agencies to have unlimited
access to the complete DNA record database of millions of individuals, usually of
convicted criminals (e.g., CODIS12 in the US). The motivation behind creating
such a database is to find a record that matches the DNA evidence from a
crime scene. Yet, providing unlimited access to law enforcement agencies is
unnecessary and may open the system to abuse. Cryptographic approaches
have been developed to preserve the privacy of the records that fail to match
the evidence from the crime scene [Bohannon et al., 2000]. Specifically, DNA
records can be encrypted using a key that depends upon certain tests, such that
when DNA is collected from a crime scene, the scheme will only allow decryption
of the records that match the evidence.
Finally, partial homomorphic encryption can be used for privacy-preserving
matching of Short Tandem Repeat (STR) DNA profiles in honest-but-curious
model [Bruekers et al., 2008]. Such protocols (described in VII.D) are useful for
identity, paternity, ancestry and forensic tests.
VII.D Direct-to-consumer (DTC)
Many DTC companies provide genealogy and ancestry testing. Cryptographic
schemes can be used to conduct those tests in privacy-preserving fashion. Partial
homomorphic encryption can be cleverly used on STR profiles of individuals to
conduct (i) common ancestor testing based on the Y chromosome, (ii) paternity
test with one parent, (iii) paternity test with two parents, and (iv) identity
testing [Bruekers et al., 2008].
Despite the increasing use of DTC genome applications, less focus has been
given to the security and privacy of this domain. In particular, genomic data ag-
gregation issues require special attention because some companies allow people
to publish high-density SNP profiles online in combination with demographic
and phenotypic data.
12Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), The Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://goo.
gl/s99EX7
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VIII Challenges for Genome Privacy
While the value of genome sequencing in routine care has yet to be fully demon-
strated, it is anticipated that the plummeting cost and commoditization of these
analyses will change the practice of medicine. Data confidentiality and individ-
ual privacy will be central to the acceptance and widespread usage of genomic in-
formation by healthcare systems. However, a clear demonstration of the clinical
usefulness of genomics is first needed for doctors and other healthcare providers
to fully embrace genomics and privacy.
VIII.A Clinical Implementation
In order for genomics to be widely adopted in the clinical world, it must be wo-
ven into existing healthcare structures. The demonstration of scientific validity
and clinical utility of genomic testing is an obvious prerequisite, but will not
be sufficient if results are not brought to clinicians in an intuitive and timely
manner. In particular, genomic data will have to be integrated into more ef-
ficient EHRs [Ury, 2013]. These will enable storage and access to data in a
secure way, but will also provide appropriate decision support tools that do not
require genomic expertise [Overby et al., 2013]. A number of for-profit ventures
are offering genome interpretation services to clinicians and hospitals, as well as
individual consumers. As such, various models of interactions between health
care providers, patients and their personal genomic data are thus likely to grow
in the following years.
Another fundamental requirement for large-scale implementation of genomic
medicine is genetic education. A strong effort is needed here, oriented both to-
ward healthcare providers and the general population. An increased level of
health and genetic literacy will be critical to put patients in a position where
they understand the risks and benefits of genomic-based medicine, and as a
consequence can make informed decisions. Up until now, genetic information
has been put into context for patients undergoing genetic testing by profes-
sionals (genetic counselors or geneticists), most often in the highly specialized
environment of a genetic division and in the context of Mendelian diseases or
reproductive counseling. Because genomics will become ever more an integra-
tive part of medicine, alternative models must be considered in which primary
health care providers will have to play a central role [McCarthy et al., 2013].
VIII.B Consumer-driven Genomics
An unprecedented aspect of contemporary genomics that comes with its own set
of issues for data confidentiality is democratization, including facilitated access
to large-scale personal, health-related data. Whereas medical and genetic in-
formation used to be obtainable only through hospital or research laboratories,
people can now access their own genotyping or sequencing results through direct-
to-consumer companies such as 23andMe, as discussed before. On the research
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side, numerous participant-centric initiatives have recently been launched (no-
tably by citizens’ networks such as OpenSNP and the Personal Genome Project).
As a result, genomic data are increasingly found outside the controlled cocoon
of healthcare systems or research. In particular, individual genetic results or
aggregated datasets are available on the Internet, often with non-existent or
minimal protection. On one hand, these crowd-based initiatives are very excit-
ing, because they have the potential to stimulate biomedical research, accelerate
discoveries and empower individuals. Yet, on the other hand, they raise a num-
ber of concerns about potential privacy risks (as highlighted in Section IX). For
example, privacy risks must here be assessed in the context of the extensive na-
ture of information available on the Internet (including online social networks),
and not only within the narrower confines of genomic research or clinical care
delivery.
VIII.C Privacy and the Benefits of Genomic Data
It is important to note that both a lack and an excess of privacy have the po-
tential to derail the expected benefits of genomics in healthcare and research.
On one hand, the efficient and secured handling of individual genotype and se-
quence data will be central to the implementation of genomic medicine. The
Hippocratic Oath remains a pillar of medical deontology and one of the few
stable concepts in the highly tumultuous history of medical practice. Trust is
at the core of any successful healthcare system: any leakage of highly sensitive
genomic information may raise concerns and opposition in the population and
among political decision makers. Earning and conserving trust is essential for
hospitals and private companies that deal with genomics. As a result, there
is a potential for a service industry securing genomic data, either by providing
ad hoc solutions or by fully supporting storage and delivery of raw/interpreted
sequence information. Fortunately, as detailed in Section VII, there exists a
variety of tools that can mitigate the problem. On the other hand, an excess of
privacy-related hurdles could slow down research and interfere with large-scale
adoption of genomics in clinical practice. When designing privacy-preserving so-
lutions for genomic data, security and privacy researchers should keep in mind
that most end-users are not familiar with computer science and are almost ex-
clusively interested in the clinical utility of test results.
Education is again a fundamental requirement for privacy protection. How-
ever, in bioinformatics curricula, students are trained to maximize the infor-
mation to be extracted from (biological) data. Usually, such curricula do not
address security and privacy concerns, because adversarial scenarios are out of
their scope. Conversely, computer scientists rarely have formal training in bi-
ology, let alone genomics. But, they are better and better trained in security,
notably because of the formidable challenge raised by the numerous vulnerabil-
ities of the Internet. Consequently, to properly address the concerns about ge-
nomic data protection, there is a clear and strong potential of cross-fertilization
between these two disciplines.
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VIII.D Acceptable Utility vs. Privacy of Genomic Data
The balance between acceptable utility and privacy of genomic data needs to
be considered in context.
Healthcare: patient-level information must be as precise as possible. Be-
cause genomic data is used here to support clinical decision, including in life-
threatening situations, any decrease in data accuracy must be avoided. Security
of electronic medical records and other health-related information is therefore
most often guaranteed through restricted access (e.g., intranet use, password
and card identification) to unmodified data. It is important to note, however,
that genetic testing is rarely urgent, and that privacy-preserving measures that
would slightly delay a test result could be tolerated.
Research: research on complex trait genomics relies on large datasets on which
genotyping or sequencing association studies can be run. To gain statistical
power and detect meaningful associations, it is often necessary to merge many
such studies through meta-analyses that can include data from hundreds of
thousands of individuals. Due to non-uniform use of technological platforms, to
variation in time and place of genotyping, and to differences in analysis pipelines,
some degree of noise is then unavoidable. An interesting avenue for research is
here to empirically determine whether differential privacy strategies (e.g., [John-
son and Shmatikov, 2013]) can be applied without compromising discovery.
Legal and forensics: DNA collection and search for similarity pattern in ge-
nomic data are used in criminal investigations and for other legal purposes like
paternity testing. The accuracy of any test result is here again an absolute
requirement to avoid legal prejudice. Extremely stringent data protection must
also be ensured due to the highly sensitive nature of such cases.
Direct-to-consumer genomics: companies providing individual genomic data
have a clear commercial incentive to protect customers’ privacy, in order to
maintain trust and gain new customers. For example, the 23andMe webpage
states: “Your personalized web account provides secure and easy access to your
information, with multiple levels of encryption and security protocols protecting
your personal information.” Of course, these measures are ineffective when in-
dividuals choose to unveil their full identity online together with their genetic
information, thereby putting their genome privacy (and one of their relatives) at
risk, either knowingly (as in the case of Personal Genome Project participants)
or out of naivety.
IX Framework for Privacy-Preserving handling
of Genomic data
In this section, we provide a general framework for security and privacy in the
handling of genomic data. The framework is illustrated in Figure 9. As has been
done throughout this SoK, we divide the framework into four categories: (i)
healthcare, (ii) research, (iii) legal and forensics, and (iv) direct-to-consumer
genomics. This classification is based on the most popular uses of genomic
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Figure 9: Genomic data handling framework: DNA is extracted from an individual’s
tissue or cells. DNA is digitized either using sequencing (to obtain Whole Genome
Sequence (WGS) or Whole Exome Sequence (WES)) or genotyping (to obtain variants
(usually only SNPs)). Reads obtained from sequencing are aligned to form the com-
plete genome, while genotyped variants are digitized from the microchip array directly.
Read data may be stored for later analysis. The aligned genome can be either stored
in raw form or compressed form (variations from a reference human genome). Medical
tests and other types of computation shown in the figure can be performed either on
raw aligned genome or just on variants. Possible outputs of computation are shown.
Output depends on the type of computation and in some cases there is no output. The
figure shows the genomic data aggregation problem caused by recreational genomics
services. The figure is divided into three sections based on fundamental limitations
of legal and technical measures for the protection of genomic data. Legal protection
is required for the left section, legal as well as technical protection is required for the
middle section, while, in theory, technical solutions would suffice for the protection of
the right section. The legend shows which blocks are associated with different uses of
genomic data. We use the word “patient” in this paper to mean someone who’s genome
is sequenced or genotyped and not necessarily a sick person.
data; however, we recognize that the boundaries between these categories are
blurred and there is significant overlap. For each of these we address setting,
threat model, and solutions and open problems. The setting provides the most
general environment around the problem (e.g., we do not discuss the possibility
of outsourcing the computation as one can easily extend our setting to another
one involving a third party).
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IX.A Biospecimen
DNA is obtained in chemical form and then digitized. This cyber-physical
nature of DNA creates unique challenges for its protection.
IX.A.1 Threat Model
In our threat model, the adversary is capable of (i) obtaining DNA from an
individual’s biological cells either voluntarily (e.g., for research with informed
consent) or involuntarily (e.g., leftover hairs or saliva on a coffee cup), (ii)
sequencing or genotyping the DNA from biospecimen, (iii) interpreting the se-
quenced data to breach identity, disease, kinship, and any other sensitive in-
formation, and (iv) linking the genomic data (or biospecimen) to the identity,
health record, or any arbitrary background information about the individual.
IX.A.2 Solutions and Open Problems
Legal protection is necessary to protect the biospecimen and the DNA (in its
chemical form). However, a solution to this problem is a subject of public
policy and is outside the scope of this paper.
IX.B Digitization: Sequencing/Genotyping
IX.B.1 Setting
A biospecimen is obtained by an agency (e.g., hospital) and is sequenced or
genotyped either by the same agency or by an external agency (e.g., Illumina,
23andMe etc.).
IX.B.2 Threat Model
Since a biospecimen is required for digitization, we assume the threat model
discussed in Section IX.A.1 with the following extensions: (i) the adversary
has full control over the entire sequencing or genotyping infrastructure, (ii) the
adversary can be honest-but-curious and can attempt to learn partial or entire
genomic data or any information derived from the genomic data, and (iii) the
adversary can be malicious and can compromise the integrity of partial or entire
genomic data.
IX.B.3 Solutions and Open Problems
Given the cyber-physical nature of DNA, it is not possible to address this is-
sue with technical measures alone. Both legal and technical protections are
required to protect against this threat. An external agency cannot derive ge-
nomic data without a biospecimen, and legal protection is required to prevent
misuse. Sequencing machines are expensive and are manufactured by a limited
number of companies. We envision a well-regulated process for the manufactur-
ing, procurement and use of sequencing machines and government regulations
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in place for it. The FDA already regulates the manufacturing of medical de-
vices13 [Cheng, 2003]. Regular inspections would check for compliance. Under
such legal protections, sequencing machines could have tamper resistant trusted
computing base (TCB) that could output encrypted data so even the sequenc-
ing agency could not legally access the plaintext genomic data. Digital rights
management (DRM) based technologies could also be beneficial for sequencing
machines.
IX.C Storage
We assume that once the adversary has access to the read data, it is easy to get
raw aligned data and variant data, hence we present storage of all three forms
of data together.
IX.C.1 Setting
Genomic data can be stored by the (i) patient14, (ii) healthcare organization
(e.g., as part of patient’s EHR), or (iii) a third party.
IX.C.2 Threat Model
For all settings, we assume that the lifetime of genomic data is much longer
than the lifetime of a cryptographic algorithm. We consider the following threat
models
Patient: Storage media or the device storing genomic data can be lost, stolen
or temporarily accessed. A patient’s computer can be attacked by an adversary
(curious or malicious) to compromise confidentiality and/or integrity of the ge-
nomic data. We further assume that an adversary can associate the identity and
background information (including phenotype information) from any arbitrary
source. And, we assume that the adversary can use the compromised genomic
data for any arbitrary purpose.
Hospital: We consider all of the threats described for the patient and the
following additional threats. An insider (or hacker) has full access to the infras-
tructure and can link genomic information to the phenotypic information in the
patient’s health record.15 We also consider the threat of the healthcare organi-
zation communicating incidental findings that are harmful – violating the right
not to know.16 We assume that the adversary can intentionally try to figure out
variants of regions of the genome from variants in other regions, e.g., to learn
some sensitive SNPs removed due to incidental finding issues. We also assume
that a healthcare organization could illegally collude with insurance agencies to
13http://goo.gl/I942hy
14We use the word patient to mean an individual whose genome is sequenced or genotyped
and not necessarily a sick person.
15We assume that data stored at the hospital is not anonymized.
16For instance, if a doctor telling a patient that his increased susceptibility to Alzheimer’s,
when he doesn’t want to know. We emphasize that defining what is harmful is an ethical
issue and is out of scope of this study.
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facilitate discrimination based on genomic data.
Third party: We consider all of the threats discussed for the hospital and
following additional threats. The adversary, as the third party itself, can be in-
terested in de-anonymizing the anonymized genomic data or aggregate genomic
data.
IX.C.3 Solutions and Open Problems
We report some solutions in Section VII. Users are generally not equipped with
skills and equipment to protect the security and privacy of their genomic data.
For the storage of genomic data, an option is to store it on a cloud in an
encrypted fashion, which makes the adversary’s job harder, as now it needs to
circumvent cloud storage security measures and also require to hack into user’s
computer to steal the decryption key. Efficient encryption schemes allowing
secure storage and computation are required.
IX.D Alignment/Assembly
As explained in Section VII, genomic data is obtained from the specimen in
the form of short reads. These short reads are then assembled using alignment
or assembly algorithms. Alignment is done by comparing the short reads to
the reference genome, and is computationally very intensive. Hence, it can be
economically beneficial to delegate the alignment to the cloud.
IX.D.1 Setting
Short reads are obtained and alignment is delegated to an untrusted third party.
IX.D.2 Threat Model
We assume that the third party can be honest-but-curious, as well as malicious,
and can return incorrect results for economic or other malicious motives.
IX.D.3 Solutions and open problems
We presented some solutions to this problem in Section VII [Chen et al., 2012].
However, there are several problems with the most efficient solution to date.
First, it is not provably secure. Second, its security and efficiency requires that
the read size be greater than 100 nucleotides. Third, this scheme only works
in a hybrid cloud environment and requires local computation. Given that
our survey shows that third party environments are of the greatest concern to
biomedical researchers, a provably secure and efficient solution that is capable of
aligning the human genome in a cloud computing environment is an important
open research problem.
31
IX.E Interpretation
Interpretation depends upon two private inputs: the patient’s genomic data
and an interpretation algorithm (possibly from more than one party). Given
the complexity of genomic data, it is unlikely that any single party will have a
complete interpretation algorithm. This makes the computation a multiparty
process between independent parties and the patient. Although each party
with a piece of the interpretation algorithm can compute independently with
the patient, collusion of any two parties may leak information about another
party’s inputs. Moreover, the interpretation of one party may depend upon
the interpretation of another party. We assume that all of these parties can
be malicious and can collude to learn information (e.g., the patient’s genomic
data or another parties’ algorithm). In some cases, it is necessary to sequence
one’s parent to draw conclusions, in which case parents might also be concerned
about their privacy.
Personalized medicine is a special case of interpretation and depends upon
the patient’s genomic data and disease markers (possibly distributed among
multiple parties).
Preconception testing is different from personalized medicine because it is a
pre-pregnancy test and measures can be taken to conceive a healthy child (as
evident from www.counsyl.com success stories). Additionally, the outcome of
the preconception test almost always depends upon two people, each of whom
might prefer to not disclose their genomic status to the other.
IX.E.1 Setting
Computation is typically performed on private data from multiple parties. The
parties involved in computation are those who input (i) their genomic data and
(ii) interpretation algorithms. The output of the computation should only be
released to the patient or authorized physician (possibly using the infrastructure
of a healthcare organization).
IX.E.2 Threat Model
We assume that all parties can be honest-but-curious, malicious, or colluding
(and possibly all at the same time). They can use arbitrary background knowl-
edge to breach privacy. Furthermore, they may use falsified genomic data, or
an interpretation algorithm, an arbitrary number of times to ascertain another
parties’ private inputs.
IX.E.3 Solutions and Open Problems
We discussed some of the solutions for the personalized medicine scenario in
Section VII. However, current solutions are limited to privacy-preserving dis-
ease susceptibility tests. It is clear that computational solutions that support a
broad range of computation over genomic data are needed. At the same time,
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the design of such systems must be practical because physicians and biomed-
ical scientists have different usability, accuracy and privacy expectations from
security and privacy researchers.
IX.F Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS)
IX.F.1 Setting
The genomic data from two groups of people are collected, one being the case
group (i.e., people with the disease) and the other being the control group (i.e.,
people without the disease). Statistical analysis is then conducted to discover
the correlation between the disease and genetic variants. The results are subse-
quently published in research papers and posted online possibly with restricted
access (e.g., at dbGaP).
IX.F.2 Threat Model
An adversary may wish to determine if the victim is a GWAS participant or
blood relative of a GWAS participant. We assume that the adversary has access
to the high density SNP profile of the victim and also to a reference population
(which can be obtained from the same GWAS conducted on a different popula-
tion). The attack succeeds if the adversary can gain knowledge from the data
produced by GWAS, which she otherwise would not have.
IX.F.3 Solutions and Open Problems
There are various solutions that could be applied in this setting. We explained
noise-based solutions, such as differential privacy, in Section VII.B. Yet, differ-
ential privacy-based solutions make data more noisy, which make adoption of
these approaches difficult. This is particularly problematic because biomedical
researchers and physicians want more (not less) accurate data than is available
today. An ideal solution should preserve the utility of data while preserving the
privacy of participants. We believe that more research is required in this area to
determine if noise-based approaches can lead to more usable and pragmatic data
publications. These approaches may, for instance, build upon well-established
sets of practices from other communities. For example, the Federal Committee
on Statistical Methodology (FCSM) has a long history of sharing information in
a privacy respective manner. These practices obey multi-level access principles
and, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, no significant privacy breach from
such domain has been reported.
While the data disclosed by federal agencies is quite different from high-
dimensional genomic data, it might be possible to adapt practices to balance
the benefits and harms caused by public sharing of aggregate genomic data.
These strategies may be composed of social and technical protections. From
a social perspective, a popular method to mitigate risk is through contractual
agreements which prohibit the misuse of such data. Such contracts could be
complemented by cryptographic protocols that help preserve the privacy of the
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participants, particularly in settings in which the data is used in the secure
computation and only the output of the computation is revealed to a specific
party.
IX.G Data sharing
The majority of genome-phenome discoveries come from very large populations,
sometimes on the order of millions of participants. Given the costs and scarcity
of such resources, sharing data would fuel biomedical research. However, sharing
this data entails privacy implications as discussed earlier.
IX.G.1 Setting
Genomic data needs to be shared among different research institutions, possibly
under different jurisdictions. Privacy-preserving solutions can be built in the
following settings: (i) all data delegated to and computation done on a trusted
party (e.g., a governmental entity), (ii) all data delegated to and computation
done on an untrusted party, (iii) all data stored at and computation done at the
collection agency, (iv) sharing data using data use agreements, and (v) sharing
anonymized data.
IX.G.2 Threat Model
We assume that data is being shared between untrusted parties. The parties
with whom data is being shared may want to use it for any arbitrary purpose,
including using it for participant re-identification, or for finding disease suscep-
tibility of the patients and his blood relatives. We also assume that once the
data is shared, it can be used in an arbitrary manner.
IX.G.3 Solutions and Open Problems
We described some solutions in Section VII.B. However, these solutions do not
allow for arbitrary computations on encrypted data. Theoretically, many cryp-
tographic solutions exist to solve this issue. For example, fully homomorphic
encryption (FHE) can be used to encrypt the data and arbitrary computations
can be done on it while preserving privacy, but data needs to be decrypted by
the party that encrypted the data. Functional encryption (FE) could also be
used, through which any arbitrary function can be computed on encrypted data.
However, FHE and FE are not sufficiently efficient to be practically useful. The
performance of FHE and FE is progressing and these schemes might be usable
in the future to support data sharing. Clearly though, specialized efficient solu-
tions for genomic data exploiting nature of genomic data are needed to support
specific analytics.
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IX.H Paternity
Genomic data is extensively used to determine parentage and test results are
admissible in courts of law. Today, the biospecimen of the individuals involved
in the tests are outsourced to a third party in the form of cheek swabs, where
the DNA is extracted. Sending one’s DNA to a third party could have serious
implications for one’s privacy.
IX.H.1 Setting
Two parties each have their sequenced genome or variants and one party wants
to know whether the other party is the patient.
IX.H.2 Threat Model
The threat model in this case is the standard model defined for secure two-party
computations. We assume that parties can be honest-but-curious or malicious.
IX.H.3 Solutions and Open Problems
In Section VII, we explain some of the solutions to the problem. A chemical test
– RFLP – can be simulated for a neat and efficient privacy-preserving solution,
given that genomes are stored by individual’s themselves [Baldi et al., 2011].
Yao’s garbled circuits can be used instead of PSI to output a binary answer
(YES or NO) instead of the number of matched segments in simulated RFLP
test.
IX.I Forensic DNA Databases
Many countries maintain a huge database of DNA profiles of convicted (and, in
some cases, accused) criminals. Law enforcement agencies usually have unlim-
ited access to such a resource, which makes it vulnerable to abuse. It is possible
that in near future, instead of concise DNA profiles, law enforcement agencies
will be able to have access to full genome sequences of individuals, which further
exacerbates the issues.
IX.I.1 Setting
Police officers collect DNA samples from a crime scene. Then, they want to
check whether an individual with the same DNA profile/sequence is present in
the DNA records database.
IX.I.2 Threat Model
We assume that the adversary can be honest-but-curious, interested in learning
about other people in the database. In addition, if the adversary has write access
to the database, he can also try to compromise the integrity of the record(s) in
35
the database. We also assume that the adversary is able to affect the outcome
of a query in arbitrary manner.
IX.I.3 Solutions and Open Problems
We discussed some of the existing solutions to this problem in Section VII.
Theoretically, this problem differs from interpretation and other types of com-
putation, as the privacy for query is not required, only the privacy of the indi-
viduals other than the suspect is of concern here. This makes the problem more
tractable, possibly making solutions scalable to large databases with millions of
records.
IX.J Recreational Genomics
Several commercial companies offer direct-to-consumer genomics services. They
include kinship, ancestry and partner compatibility testing.
IX.J.1 Setting
The customer ships her specimen (usually saliva) to a company. This specimen
is used to genotype typically one million SNPs and the data is then digitized and
stored in digital form on the server. Some computation is done on this data for
ancestry, disease susceptibility, kinship or other tests. The data and the results
are then available for the user to download or see through a browser. Some
companies (e.g., 23andme) allow to search for people with common ancestors
e.g., 3rd, 4th or 5th cousins.
IX.J.2 Threat Model
We assume the threat models for specimen collection, digitization and inter-
pretation. There are also new threats. The owner of the data posts his data
online along with his identity and some phenotypical data, as done for example
on openSNP.org. We assume that the data owner makes an informed decision,
so he willingly gives away his genome privacy. The major threat then is to the
blood relatives of the data owner, whose private information is also leaked.
Genomic data aggregation is another issue caused by users posting their
genomic data online. This data can be aggregated by companies and then used
for commercial or other purposes. It is worth noting that some genome-sharing
websites have an achievement programs where users get rewards whenever they
post their phenotype data (e.g., hair color, eye color, disease pre-disposition
etc.). Genomic data along with phenotypic data is much more valuable than
genomic data alone.
IX.J.3 Solutions and Open Problems
All other solutions apply here, however recreational genomics presents new prob-
lems of public sharing and genomic data aggregation. We emphasize that public
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awareness is required to enable people to make an informed decision to share
their genomic data publicly and thus compromising their own and their rela-
tives’ privacy. It should be made clear that in case of abuse of this publicly
available data, people would be discouraged to share genomic data even for le-
gitimate research purposes. However, this is a policy and ethics debate and is
out of scope of this paper.
Conclusion
The confluence of cheap computing and high-throughput sequencing technolo-
gies is making genomic data increasingly easy to collect, store, and process. At
the same time, genomic data is being integrated into a wide range of applica-
tions in diverse settings (e.g., healthcare, forensics, consumer-related products),
such that privacy and security issues have yet to be sufficiently defined and
addressed. For instance, massive computation capability is needed to analyze
genomic data for research purposes, such that the cloud is likely to play a large
role in the management of such data. At the same time, genomic data will
be used in specific applications (e.g., forensics) where mobile computing envi-
ronments (e.g., tablets and smartphones) will be routinely used to access those
data. And, genomic data will be increasingly available on the Web, especially
in citizen-contributed environments, (e.g., online social networks). While some
individuals are sharing such information, there are significant privacy concerns
because it is not known what such information is capable of revealing, or how
it will be used in the future.
As such, there is a clear need to support personalized medicine, genomic
research, forensic investigation and recreational genomics while respecting pri-
vacy. Computing is a crucial enabler, but can also be the first source of leakage if
appropriate mechanisms are not put in place. Our survey (opinion poll from the
biomedical community) provides some insight into what may be the most impor-
tant aspects of the problem to study. And, along these lines, we have provided
a review of the state-of-the-art regarding computational protection methods in
this field, as well as the main challenges moving forward. To assist the data pri-
vacy and security community to develop meaningful solutions, we have provided
a framework to facilitate the understanding of the privacy-preserving handling
of genomic data.
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